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I. INTRODUCTION
I had AIDS. I was the only gay person left in the world [be]cause
the government found all the other gays and killed them as
children and if they found me, they would kill me. It’s the perfect
way to keep a child or a teen from coming out. We moved on to
physical therapy. Physical therapy was my hands being tied down
and blocks of ice being placed on my hands. Then pictures of
men holding hands would be shown to me so that way I would
associate the concept of the pain of ice with a man touching me.
It worked really, really, really well. My dad could barely even
hug me anymore [because] I would scream out in pain. Then we
moved into heat. [C]oils would be placed around my hands and
you’d be able to turn the heat on or off. So, now, if we had a
picture of a guy and a girl hugging it was no pain. If we had a guy
and a guy hugging, we had physical pain. We then went into the
month of hell. The month of hell consisted of tiny needles being
stuck into my fingers and then pictures of explicit acts between
men would be shown and I would be electrocuted. At this point I
was completely done. GOD did not want me on this Earth
anymore.1
This is Sam Brinton’s account of his experience with sexual orientation
change efforts (“SOCE” or “conversion therapy”).2 The purpose of SOCE
is to change the sexual orientation of individuals through therapy, though
most, if not all, efforts seek to convert homosexual3 persons to heterosexual
persons.4 While not all SOCE involves the drastic measures that Sam
endured, it remains a controversial therapy and the American Psychological

1.

See About, I’M FROM DRIFTWOOD, http://www.imfromdriftwood.com/
about-us (last visited on Sept. 15, 2013) (detailing the mission of I’m From Driftwood,
an organization that promotes acceptance and understanding of the lesbian, gay,
bisexual, transgendered, queer (LGBTQ) community through storytelling and sharing).
2. See Sam Brinton, I’m From Perry, IA—Video Story, I’M FROM DRIFTWOOD,
http://www.imfromdriftwood.com/im-from-perry-ia-video-story (last visited on Sept.
15, 2013) (relaying how Sam Brinton’s homosexual feelings resurfaced during college
despite the “success” of conversion therapy). Although Sam’s conversion therapy was
conducted by a religious counselor, the treatments Sam endured are similar to those
treatments used by SOCE therapists.
3. This paper uses the term “homosexual” to refer to all lesbian, gay, bisexual,
transgender, and queer (“LGBTQ”) persons to maintain consistency with the courts’
terminology.
4. See AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON
APPROPRIATE THERAPEUTIC RESPONSES TO SEXUAL ORIENTATION 12 n.5 (2009)
[hereinafter APA TASK FORCE] (defining sexual orientation change efforts (“SOCE”)
as methods that seek to change homosexual orientation through behavioral and
psychoanalytical techniques).
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Association (“APA”) encourages mental health providers to avoid it.5 In
response to the growing controversy regarding SOCE and concern about
the potential harm that such therapy may cause, the California legislature
banned mental health professionals from engaging in conversion therapy
with individuals under the age of eighteen (“SB 1172”).6 Any mental
health provider that engages in SOCE with a minor thereby engages in
professional misconduct, and the licensing board may censure that
therapist.7 Within days of Governor Jerry Brown signing the ban against
conversion therapy, SOCE therapists, advocates, and organizations filed
two lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of the ban on First
Amendment grounds and seeking preliminary and permanent injunctions to
prevent the law from taking effect.8 Following appeals from the losing
parties in both district court decisions, the Ninth Circuit held that SB 1172
is not an infringement of First Amendment free speech rights.9 The
plaintiffs-appellants have since filed for a rehearing en banc.10
This Comment discusses why the Ninth Circuit correctly determined that
SB 1172 does not implicate free speech rights, and analyzes why SB 1172
does not unduly burden the free exercise of religion.11 This Comment
shows that SB 1172 survives heightened scrutiny and discusses why the
trial court that issued the preliminary injunction in Welch v. Brown erred by

5. See id. at 66 (concluding that psychologists are currently unable to determine
the efficacy or safety of SOCE, but research indicates it may cause harm and should be
avoided).
6. See Ca. Bans Therapy Meant to Turn Gay Kids Straight, NPR (Oct. 4, 2012,
12:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/10/04/162294049/ca-bans-therapy-meant-to-turngay-kids-straight (explaining that the impetus for SB 1172 was a documentary about a
man who committed suicide after years of conversion therapy).
7. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 4982 (West 2013) (declaring that professional
censure of therapists includes denial, revocation, or suspension of professional
licensure).
8. See Pickup v. Brown, No. 2:12-CV-02497-KJM-EFB, 2012 WL 6021465, at
*1 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2012) (indicating SB 1172 was signed on September 29, 2012,
and the action was filed October 4, 2012); Welch v. Brown, 907 F.2d 1102, 1106-07
(E.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2012) (noting a filing date of October 1, 2012).
9. Pickup v. Brown, 728 F.3d 1042, 1056 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding that SB 1172
regulates professional conduct, and that any infringement on speech is merely
incidental).
10. Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc at 6-7, Pickup v. Brown, 728
F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2013) (claiming that the Ninth Circuit mistakenly used plenary
review and ignored controlling precedent that favored the plaintiffs).
11. See infra Part III (specifying that the California and federal constitutions
protect against laws that infringe on speech or those that burden religious belief, but do
not protect against generally applicable, neutral laws or mere conduct).
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reviewing SB 1172 under strict scrutiny.12 Part II provides an overview of
SB 1172, addressing the law as well as the legislative intent behind the
law.13 Part II also discusses the original lawsuits challenging SB 1172 and
the judges’ differing decisions on the free speech challenges.14 Finally,
Part II presents an overview of the law under the First Amendment,
specifically with regard to free speech and the free exercise of religion.15
Part III provides a legal analysis of constitutional challenges to the ban on
conversion therapy—the therapists’ right to free speech and the minors’
and parents’ right to the free exercise of religion.16 This section discusses
why SOCE is not protected free speech and shows how SB 1172 meets the
rational basis test.17 Part III also shows that even if the Ninth Circuit
vacated its decision on rehearing and held that SOCE is a form of protected
speech, the Court should still only apply intermediate scrutiny—which SB
1172 survives—because SOCE constitutes fraud. While the United States
and California constitutions afford free speech their highest protections,
neither protects fraud at that same level.18 Part IV discusses the
implications for other free speech challenges to medical regulations, such
as compelled speech challenges by physicians who provide abortions and
are required to make certain statements prior to providing services, that
might arise if the Court were to strike down SB 1172 on rehearing.19 Part
IV also suggests ways in which the legislature could protect against future
challenges to SB 1172, should the Ninth Circuit en banc find that the ban is
unconstitutional as it stands.20 Finally, Part V concludes that because SB

12. See infra Part III (characterizing SOCE as conduct, not speech, and arguing
that if it is speech, it is fraud and unprotected).
13. See infra Part II (outlining the limitations SB 1172 places on mental health
professionals providing SOCE for minors).
14. See infra Part II (explaining the arguments in Pickup and Welch and the
differing decisions).
15. See infra Part II (discussing free speech and minors’ right to the free exercise
of religion).
16. See infra Part III (analyzing the ban on SOCE through the lens of free speech
and the free exercise of religion).
17. See infra Part III (showing that rational basis review is appropriate for a ban on
treatments such as electroshock therapy, effigy-beating, and encouragement to shower
with one’s father).
18. See infra Part III (comparing SOCE to fraud because the therapists knowingly
make false or misleading statements with the intention of eliciting compensation).
19. See infra Part IV (identifying abortion laws that, if SB 1172 were held
unconstitutional, could also be held unconstitutional as free speech violations because
they require physicians to convey information they do not believe).
20. See infra Part IV (suggesting that the California legislature commission studies
to demonstrate the harmful effects of SOCE).
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1172 does not infringe on free speech or the free exercise of religion under
either the federal or California constitutions, the Ninth Circuit should
affirm its decision to uphold the ban on SOCE in the interest of protecting
lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgendered, and queer (LGBTQ) youth, as well as
preventing an onslaught of challenges to other medical regulations.21
II. BACKGROUND
A. Sexual Orientation Change Efforts
Sexual orientation change efforts are therapies that aim to alter an
individual’s sexual orientation.22 Although therapists differ widely on their
techniques, conversion therapy is generally categorized as either aversion
therapy, focusing on physical treatments, or non-aversion therapy, utilizing
techniques that focus on the mind and changing behavior patterns.23
The controversial nature of SOCE has gained national attention over the
past few years.24 In light of this attention and society’s changing views on,
and understanding of homosexuality, every major medical and mental
health organization has rejected SOCE as a legitimate therapeutic
Despite those positions, SOCE therapists claim that
treatment.25
conversion therapy is effective, profess that homosexuality is only a
temporary condition, and tell patients that if they put in enough effort, then
the patient can successfully reduce or eliminate homosexual feelings.26
These therapists also focus on teaching homosexuals how to not act on
21. See infra Part V (concluding that striking down SB 1172 will limit the State’s
power to regulate the medical field and will lead to mass disobedience of laws on
religious grounds).
22. See APA TASK FORCE, supra note 4, at 12 (stating SOCE arose in response to
the idea that homosexuality is a mental disorder).
23. See Chuck Bright, Deconstructing Reparative Therapy: An Examination of the
Processes Involved When Attempting to Change Sexual Orientation, 32 CLINICAL SOC.
WORK J. 471, 473-77 (2004) (noting that techniques include telling patients that
homosexuality does not exist and results from childhood sexual molestation).
24. See, e.g., Criminal Minds: Broken (CBS television broadcast Feb. 20, 2013)
(portraying a former SOCE patient who killed his lovers because his therapy filled him
with shame and hatred).
25. See The Lies and Dangers of Reparative Therapy, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN,
(last
http://www.hrc.org/resources/entry/the-lies-and-dangers-of-reparative-therapy
visited Sept. 15, 2013) (recognizing that the limited research on SOCE has disproven
its efficacy and discussing a therapist’s disavowal of his studies claiming SOCE is
effective).
26. See
Quick
Facts,
FACTS
ABOUT
YOUTH,
http://factsaboutyouth.com/getthefacts/quickfacts (last visited Sept. 15, 2013) (offering
“facts” and resources, compiled by SOCE therapists, for youths wrestling with their
sexuality).
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their sexual feelings, even if same-sex attraction is still present.27
B. Senate Bill 1172
Senate Bill 1172 is an amendment to California’s current regulatory
scheme for state-licensed mental health providers.28 As part of this
regulatory scheme, California prohibits treatments that it deems to
constitute unprofessional conduct for mental health providers.29 California
passed SB 1172, specifying that “under no circumstances shall a mental
health provider engage in sexual orientation change efforts with a patient
under 18 years of age.”30 As defined by SB 1172, SOCE includes efforts to
change behaviors or gender expressions or to eliminate or reduce sexual or
romantic attractions or feelings toward individuals of the same sex.31 SB
1172 does not, however, target any therapies that promote acceptance of, or
support for, one’s sexual identity or those therapies that do not seek to
change sexual orientation.32 Because the California legislature’s aim was
to protect LGBTQ minors from harmful therapies, SB 1172 targets only
conversion therapies—those therapies that purport to change the sexual
orientation of homosexuals but often only succeed in inflicting
psychological harm.33
27. See THOMAS AQUINAS PSYCHOLOGICAL CLINIC, http://josephnicolosi.com (last
visited on Sept. 15, 2013) (claiming to help patients reduce homosexual tendencies and
explore heterosexual potential).
28. See Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of
Psychology, 228 F.3d 1043, 1047 (9th Cir. 2000) (acknowledging that the state has
long regulated healthcare providers because of the harm resulting from incompetent
practice).
29. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 728 (West 2013) (censuring therapists
who do not follow proper procedure upon learning of a sexual relationship between a
patient and a therapist).
30. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 865 (West 2013); See Wyatt Buchanan, State Bans
Gay-Repair Therapy for Minors, S.F. CHRON. (Sept. 29, 2012, 11:07 PM),
http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/State-bans-gay-repair-therapy-for-minors3906032.php (reporting that Governor Brown signed SB 1172 because SOCE is
“quackery,” with no basis in science or medicine).
31. See BUS. & PROF. § 865 (relying on the APA’s opposition to a medical practice
that is based on the outdated notion that homosexuality is a mental disorder or
dysfunction).
32. See id. (adopting the position that although homosexuality is not a disease
requiring treatment, minors may need support programs to help with social
stigmatization, familial rejection, and LGBTQ community adaption).
33. See S. FLOOR ANALYSIS OF S.B. 1172, 2011-12 Leg. Sess., at 8 (Cal. 2012)
(relying, in part, on reports from the American Psychiatric Association claiming SOCE
may reinforce patient self-hatred, and anecdotal accounts indicating resulting
psychological harms).
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C. Lawsuits Seeking Preliminary Injunctions Against Senate Bill 1172 and
Challenging the Constitutionality of the Ban
1. Pickup v. Brown
The plaintiffs in Pickup v. Brown sought to enjoin SB 1172 on the
grounds that it violated, inter alia, the therapists’ right to free speech and
the parents’ and minors’ right to the free exercise of religion under the
United States and California constitutions.34 The plaintiffs alleged that the
ban is a viewpoint-based and content-based restriction on speech that fails
to serve a compelling interest and, therefore, cannot withstand judicial
scrutiny.35 The plaintiffs further claimed that SB 1172 conflicts with the
APA’s Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct as the ban
requires therapists to comply with state law rather than follow the ethical
principle of promoting patient self-determination.36
Judge Kimberly Mueller disagreed with the plaintiffs’ characterization of
SB 1172 and denied their motion for a preliminary injunction.37 She
concluded that SB 1172 was a permissible regulation on medical treatment
and did not implicate free speech rights.38 She noted that the statute
regulates only the behavior, not the speech, of mental health professionals,
because it does not prohibit a mental health professional from sharing
information about SOCE with a minor and permits the minor to seek out a
non-licensed individual, such as a religious counselor, to provide the actual
therapy.39

34. See Pickup v. Brown, No. 2:12-CV-02497-KJM-EFB, 2012 WL 6021465, at
*1 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2012) (noting plaintiffs included therapists of the National
Association for Research and Therapy of Homosexuality (NARTH), a professional
organization that encourages individuals with unwanted sexual attractions to seek
therapeutic change).
35. See id. at *7 (alleging that SB 1172 applies only to therapy aimed at changing
sexual orientation, not affirming it).
36. See APA, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGISTS AND CODE OF CONDUCT 4
(2010) (identifying the tenet that therapists must respect patient rights, such as selfdetermination).
37. See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 381 (2008)
(indicating that an injunction is inappropriate when the plaintiff is unlikely to succeed
on the merits of the claim).
38. See Pickup, 2012 WL 6021465, at *9 (stating that SB 1172 regulates conduct
because it only targets techniques aimed at affecting a change and does not impede
therapists from conveying an opinion).
39. Cf. Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 634, 637 (9th Cir. 2002) (invalidating a
law prohibiting physicians from discussing medical marijuana with their patients
because it prevented the physicians from even espousing a viewpoint).
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2. Welch v. Brown
Conversely, Judge William Shubb, presiding over Welch v. Brown,
found that the ban on SOCE is a content-based regulation and is therefore
unlikely to withstand strict scrutiny.40 Although he agreed with the
defendants that SB 1172 is a medical regulation, the judge found that the
ban nonetheless implicates free speech.41
Relying on Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project, the judge found that strict scrutiny is the
appropriate standard for all content-based regulations that, regardless of
their purpose, infringe on fundamental rights.42 Accordingly, Judge Shubb
granted the preliminary injunction.43
3. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision
On August 29, 2013, the Ninth Circuit agreed with Judge Mueller and
opined that SB 1172 is constitutional.44 Because the district court opinions
rested on interpretation of law, not fact, the Ninth Circuit undertook a de
novo review of both district court decisions.45 It concluded that SB 1172
only regulates the provision of a mental health treatment to minors, while
still allowing mental health professionals to discuss their viewpoints on
SOCE, recommend the treatment to anyone, or provide the treatment to
consenting adults.46 The Court concluded that mental health professionals
do not receive more First Amendment protection than other healthcare
professionals just because their treatments are conducted through speech.47

40. See Welch v. Brown, 907 F.2d 1102, 1105 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (determining that
the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm if the injunction were denied because any
infringement on free speech is considered to be irreparable harm).
41. See id. at 1111 (asserting that, since SOCE involves both speech and nonspeech elements, it implicates free speech rights).
42. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2723 (2010)
(rejecting intermediate scrutiny for a statute prohibiting knowingly providing material
support to a foreign terrorist organization because the statute is content-based).
43. See Welch, 907 F.2d at 1105 (deciding the balance of equities tipped in favor
of injunction as the plaintiffs would otherwise be irreparably harmed and the injunction
best served the public interest).
44. Pickup v. Brown, 728 F.3d 1042, 1056 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding that any
infringement on speech by SB 1172 is merely incidental and therefore the law is
subject only to rational basis review).
45. Id. at 1048 (noting that abuse of discretion is generally the appropriate
standard for an appellate court’s review of a district court’s determination on a
preliminary injunction).
46. Id. at 1053 (holding that doctor-patient communications are entitled to robust
First Amendment protection but the state still maintains authority to regulate medical
treatment).
47. See id. at 1055 (noting that when a drug is banned, the physician does not have
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Specifically, the Ninth Circuit concluded that mental health professionals
who perform SOCE are engaged in professional conduct, not speech.48
Professional conduct is subject only to rational basis review, which it
passes easily.49 The Court declined to decide whether SB 1172 is a
violation of the plaintiffs’ freedom of religion rights.50
D. Protections Under the United States and California Constitutions
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits federal
regulations from infringing upon an individual’s free exercise of religion
and freedom of speech.51 These freedoms extends to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.52 The California
Constitution offers similar protections to its citizens.53
1. The Right to Free Speech
While both the California and United States constitutions protect the
right to free speech, that right is not absolute and the state may permissibly
regulate certain speech.54 Depending on the nature of the infringement, the
courts assess the validity of a law under varying degrees of scrutiny.55 This
scrutiny, however, applies only when the regulation infringes on speech or
its equivalent.56 While some conduct is so expressive that the courts afford
a right to prescribe the drug).
48. Id. (comparing the therapist’s treatment to a lawyer’s disclosure of confidential
information, which is carried out through speech but still subject to professional
discipline).
49. Id. (noting that to provide First Amendment protection to any incidental
infringement on speech would unduly burden the state’s ability to regulate medical
treatments).
50. Id. at 1051 n.3 (declining to address the plaintiffs’ religious rights violation
argument since the plaintiffs did not “distinctly and specifically” argue the issue to the
district court).
51. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the
free exercise [of religion]; or abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”).
52. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (acknowledging that
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires states to respect First
Amendment rights).
53. See CAL. CONST. art. 1, §§ 2, 4 (guaranteeing the right to speak freely and
worship without fear of discrimination).
54. See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 717-18 (2000) (recognizing that free
speech does not always extend to offensive speech that is unwelcome and unavoidable
by the audience).
55. See Welch v. Brown, 907 F.2d 1102, 1113-14 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (concluding
that the court must assess the neutrality of the statute before it can identify the
appropriate level of review).
56. See, e.g., Concerned Dog Owners of Cal. v. City of L.A., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d
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it the same protection as words, the courts have deemed some words as so
worthless that they do not warrant protection at all.57
i. Standards of Review
Courts use three main standards of review to assess the validity of state
action: rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny.58 When a
state action, such as a law or professional regulation, does not implicate
any constitutional rights, then the court applies the rational basis test as the
standard of review.59 As a matter of law, the state action is valid unless the
challenger shows either that the state does not have a legitimate basis for
taking that action or that the specific action does not rationally relate to a
state interest.60
When state action implicates a fundamental right, such as the right to
free speech, the appropriate standard of review for those actions is
generally either intermediate or strict scrutiny.61 Intermediate scrutiny is
applicable to those actions that do not discriminate on the basis of
viewpoint or content.62 To pass intermediate scrutiny, the state must show
that the action is narrowly tailored to serve a significant government
interest and that it leaves open alternative avenues for communication of
the information that is otherwise regulated or controlled.63
774, 785 (Ct. App. 2011) (upholding a statute requiring owners to spay certain pets
since the law furthered state health interests and did not implicate fundamental rights).
57. See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 528 (1972) (invalidating a statute
as overbroad because it did not limit its prohibition to only “fighting words” that
breach the peace).
58. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985)
(overruling the application of intermediate scrutiny and applying rational basis review
because mental retardation is not a trait that is a quasi-suspect classification).
59. See, e.g., Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 317 (1981) (upholding, under
rational basis review, the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act after finding no
infringement on constitutional rights).
60. See id. at 326 (acknowledging that the Court cannot substitute its own
judgment if Congress shows a reasonable relationship between the means and the end
of a neutral regulation).
61. Compare United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (applying
intermediate scrutiny to a law criminalizing the destruction of a draft card), with Holder
v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2710 (2010) (employing strict scrutiny
for a statute prohibiting support of terrorist organizations).
62. See, e.g., City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 278 (2000) (finding that
while nude dancing is expressive conduct, its regulation is content-neutral and
unrelated to the suppression of the speech, and, therefore, it is reviewed under
intermediate scrutiny).
63. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2739 (2011) (striking
down a ban on the sale of violent video games since the state did not show a
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The Supreme Court has set forth a four-pronged test for determining
whether a regulation passes an intermediate level of scrutiny.64 A
regulation is constitutional if (1) it is within the power of the Government;
(2) it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; (3) the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest; and (4) the interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression.65
The court reviews those regulations that are content-based or viewpointbased restrictions on free speech under strict scrutiny, which is the most
demanding level of review.66 These regulations are presumptively invalid
unless the state can show that the action addresses a compelling interest,
that the state narrowly tailored the regulation to further its interest, and that
the regulation is the least restrictive means of achieving that end.67
ii. Free Speech “Defined”
While the standards of review for free speech are fairly straightforward,
exactly what constitutes protected speech is a more difficult question.68
Words alone are not always sufficient to implicate the First Amendment;
yet, silent actions that convey a message may be enough to trigger First
Amendment protections.69 In Spence v. Washington, the Supreme Court set
forth a two-step test for determining whether conduct is sufficiently
compelling interest as it offered no proof that the games caused minors to act
aggressively).
64. See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376 (noting that when both speech and non-speech
elements are present, substantial government interests may justify infringing on free
speech rights).
65. See id. at 377 (implying that a regulation satisfies the four elements if the
government’s interest in regulating conduct outweighs an incidental infringement on
fundamental liberty).
66. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 195 (1992) (plurality opinion)
(applying strict scrutiny to a prohibition on political speech at the polls because it was
content-based).
67. See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1592 (2010) (ruling that a law
banning depictions of animal cruelty failed strict scrutiny because it was not narrowly
tailored to further the state interest of protecting animals).
68. Compare Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1062 (9th Cir.
2010) (finding that the tattooing process is protected as speech because it is
inextricably intertwined with the tattoo—a symbol of pure expression), with Indiana v.
Brady, 492 N.E.2d 34, 39 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (determining the process of tattooing is
not constitutionally protected because it is only conduct).
69. Compare Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 400 (1989) (holding that flag
burning is protected speech because of the obvious message conveyed), with R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 372, 386 (1992) (stating that “fighting words” are a “nonspeech” form of communication because they offer no value to society).
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expressive to rise to the level of protected speech.70 The First Amendment
protects those actions that, despite not using any words, are so imbued with
elements of speech that an objective viewer would readily understand the
idea or message that the actor intended to express.71 In applying this test,
the courts are careful to note that First Amendment protection does not
automatically attach to conduct just because it involves elements of
speech.72
iii. “Speech” That Is Not “Speech”
Certain types of “speech” are so useless to society that the Supreme
Court has repeatedly found that there is no First Amendment concern when
states impose regulations that implicate this speech, though very few
categories of speech meet this test.73 Fraud is one of the few exceptions,
and the Supreme Court has made it clear that the First Amendment does not
protect fraudulent speech.74 Under California law, four main elements
comprise the tort of fraud: a knowingly false representation, the intent to
deceive or induce reliance, a justifiable reliance on the false representation,
and resulting damages.75 Generally, the statements at issue must be fact,
not opinion, although opinions in certain circumstances will give rise to
fraudulent action.76

70. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 415 (1974) (per curiam) (ruling that
a student who hung the American flag upside down with a peace symbol attached
engaged in expressive conduct since he conveyed a message that would be objectively
understood).
71. See Giebel v. Sylvester, 244 F.3d 1182, 1187 (9th Cir. 2001) (affording First
Amendment protection to a handbill because it clearly intends to convey a particular
message to the reader).
72. See, e.g., City of Dall. v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989) (rejecting the idea
that any time conduct has an element of expression, it is entitled to First Amendment
protection).
73. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012) (concluding that
there are only a few permissible content-based laws, such as those that regulate fighting
words and defamation).
74. See id. at 2547 (indicating that while the First Amendment protects false
statements, so as not to chill true speech, it does not protect false statements that result
in harm).
75. See Engalla v. Permanente Med. Grp., Inc., 938 P.2d 903, 917 (Cal. 1997)
(detailing the elements of fraud, including a reckless disregard for the truth, not just
actual knowledge of a falsity).
76. See CAL. CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 1904 (2012) (instructing jurors that
when one holds himself out as an expert, the court treats his representations as fact,
even though a non-professional would be treated as expressing an opinion).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2014

13

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 7

464

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 22:2

2. The Right to the Free Exercise of Religion
The First Amendment protects not only speech but also prohibits the
government from infringing on the free exercise of any religion or belief
system.77 As with the disputes over what constitutes speech, there is
considerable ambiguity in determining what “infringes” upon religion and
even what constitutes a “religious belief.”78
Prior to the Supreme Court’s 1990 decision in Employment Division v.
Smith, the Supreme Court afforded religious belief significantly more
protection than it does today.79 Under strict scrutiny, all laws that
substantially burdened religious freedom were invalid unless the state could
show that the law addressed a compelling state interest and was the least
restrictive means to address the interest.80 Unsurprisingly, few laws were
able to meet that burden.81 In 1990, however, the Supreme Court
broadened the state’s ability to establish laws that incidentally burdened
religion.82 Rather than reviewing laws under strict scrutiny, the Court
created a new test: if a law is a valid and neutral law of general
applicability then it is constitutional.83 The Court reasoned that to mandate
exceptions to every law that infringed upon the free exercise of any religion
would permit an individual “to become a law unto himself.”84
Reacting to the Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith,
Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), reimposing strict scrutiny on laws that infringe upon the free exercise of
77. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. (“Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the
free exercise [of religion] . . . .”).
78. See, e.g., Alvarado v. City of San Jose, 94 F.3d 1223, 1226-27 (9th Cir. 1996)
(determining whether the statue was even a religious object for purposes of a free
exercise claim).
79. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (requiring that the
state satisfy the high burden of strict scrutiny for any law infringing on religious
rights).
80. See Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 165 F.3d 692, 702 (9th Cir.
1999) (noting that “substantial” may be satisfied by even an incidental burden).
81. See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234 (invalidating a compulsory school attendance
law as applied to Amish parents who refused to send their children to school on
religious grounds).
82. See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879
(1990) (limiting the applicability of Yoder and Sherbert, and allowing laws that are
generally applicable and neutral to stand).
83. See id. at 874 (upholding a law that resulted in the firing of two Native
Americans who smoked peyote for religious purposes).
84. See id. at 879 (discussing social anarchy and constitutional anomalies that
would result if individuals could use their religious beliefs to avoid complying with the
law).
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religion.85 While the RFRA does apply to federal law, the RFRA exceeded
the scope of Congress’ authority to establish state law, although the states
may enact their own versions of the RFRA.86 California has not passed its
own version of the RFRA, and has yet to establish whether the state
reviews laws that are generally applicable and neutral under strict scrutiny
or a lesser standard of review.87
Regardless of the appropriate standard of review, only those laws that
“substantially burden” religion are constitutionally problematic.88 The
Supreme Court set forth the substantial burden test, which finds that any
law that predicates a benefit on conduct that causes an individual to choose
between engaging in the conduct and not following her beliefs, or
following her beliefs and not engaging in the conduct, constitutes a
substantial burden.89 A court should review the law only once this
threshold has been crossed.90
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Ninth Circuit Correctly Reviewed Senate Bill 1172 Under the
Rational Basis Test Because Mere Conduct Does Not Implicate First
Amendment Free Speech Rights.
1. Senate Bill 1172 Regulates Mere Conduct, Not Expressive Conduct or
Speech, and Therefore, It Does Not Implicate First Amendment Free
Speech Rights.
The First Amendment does not protect conversion therapy because the

85. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006) (finding that the compelling interest test strikes
the appropriate balance between religious liberties and government interests).
86. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997) (noting that Congress’s
power is limited to remedial, preventive legislation, and finding that the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) intruded into power reserved to the states).
87. See Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court of Sacramento
Cnty., 85 P.3d 67, 91 (Cal. 2004) (declining to identify the level of review for a law
implicating free exercise of religion as it failed even the lowest level of scrutiny).
88. See, e.g., Jimmy Swaggart Ministeries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378,
392 (1990) (affirming the California lower courts’ findings that a generally applicable
sales tax did not impose a significant burden on the organization’s religious practices).
89. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717-18
(1981) (recognizing that a substantial burden existed on an employee’s religion where
an employee was forced to choose between fidelity to her religion and keeping her job).
90. See, e.g., Smith v. Fair Emp’t & Hous. Comm’n, 913 P.2d 909, 929 (Cal.
1996) (applying no level of review after finding a prohibition against discrimination
based on marital status did not implicate a landlord’s free exercise of religion rights).
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First Amendment protects only pure speech and expressive conduct.91
Although some forms of SOCE may use speech to carry out its aim,
conversion therapy is better characterized as simply conduct, because it is
comprised of psychological treatments and practices that aim to bring about
a certain result and not express an idea.92 A plain reading of the statute
makes it clear that the ban regulates only “practices” aimed at changing
sexual orientation.93 As the trial court noted, “practices” are actions
designed to apply and carry out an idea and not actions that express the
idea itself.94 The Supreme Court has indicated that the state infringes upon
free speech rights when it restrains a speaker from communicating
information.95
SB 1172 does not prohibit the therapist from
communicating information about SOCE or even from suggesting that the
patient might benefit from SOCE.96 SB 1172 only prohibits the therapist
from performing SOCE on a patient who is under eighteen years of age.97
Just as state and federal laws permit the government to regulate drugs, the
government may also regulate medical treatments and procedures.98
The nature of therapy causes significant confusion as to whether the First
Amendment protects the speech that occurs during psychoanalysis.99 The

91. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (explaining that
speech is protected to promote an exchange of ideas).
92. See Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of
Psychology, 228 F.3d 1043, 1054 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that psychoanalysis is
conduct for First Amendment purposes because its purpose is to treat emotional
suffering and not speech).
93. See Pickup v. Brown, No. 2:12-CV-02497-KJM-EFB, 2012 WL 6021465, at
*9 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2012) (noting that, because the statute does not define “practice”
or “change,” the court should construe the words according to their plain meaning).
94. See id. (citing CONCISE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1126 (12th ed. 2011))
(defining “practice” as the “application or use of an idea, belief, or method, as opposed
to the theory or principles of it”).
95. See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32 (1984) (explaining that
restraints on how information may be used implicate free speech rights).
96. Cf. Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 637 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that
prohibiting physicians from recommending medical marijuana is unconstitutional
because it is a content-based and viewpoint-based restriction on speech).
97. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942) (distinguishing
between words intended to express an idea and verbal “acts,” such as cursing, which do
not express ideas).
98. See Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173, 176 (1910) (noting that no profession
is more ripe for regulation than the medical profession because of the substantial health
and safety concerns involved in the practice of medicine).
99. See Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of
Psychology, 228 F.3d 1043, 1054 (9th Cir. 2000) (asserting that the First Amendment
applies to speech during psychoanalysis but that the state may permissibly regulate the
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words used are akin to a surgeon’s scalpel, a prescription for an antibiotic,
or the techniques used in physical therapy; they are nothing more than the
physician’s tool for performing a treatment.100 In fact, if one thinks of
SOCE only in terms of aversion therapy—therapies such as electroshock,
burning, or drug therapy—the plaintiffs would be far less likely to succeed
in obtaining a preliminary injunction, let alone a permanent one, because
speech clearly is not implicated through those techniques, and the state
would be acting within its power to regulate medical treatments that it has
not deemed effective or safe.101 While SOCE may be carried out in part—
or even in whole—by speech, regulating conduct that implicates speech is
not an abridgment of free speech rights.102 What is being regulated here is
the underlying conduct—regardless of the method in which that conduct is
carried out—and not speech conveying a particular idea.103
Despite clear precedent establishing the state’s power to regulate medical
treatments, including mental health treatments, the lower courts disagreed
over whether SOCE implicates constitutionally protected speech.104
Because the speech involved in SOCE is nothing more than a form of
conduct, the conduct, and not the words themselves, must trigger the free
speech protections.105 Under the test set forth in Spence v. Washington, to
constitute an infringement on the free speech rights of the therapists
engaging in SOCE, the conduct that is being restricted must clearly convey
the therapists’ viewpoint.106 If the primary goal of SOCE is to change the
speech).
100. Cf. O’Brien v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Serv., 894 F. Supp. 2d 1149,
1166-67 (E.D. Mo. 2012) (finding that providing healthcare is not a statement in the
same sense as burning a flag).
101. See, e.g., Sharrer v. Zettel, No. C 04-00042 SI, 2005 WL 885129, at *7 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 7, 2005) (declaring that the state may prohibit a type of treatment or provider
because there is no fundamental right to choose a particular provider or type of
treatment).
102. See IDK, Inc. v. Cnty. of Clark, 836 F.2d 1185, 1194 (9th Cir. 1988)
(explaining that while the First Amendment protects philosophical, moral, social, and
ethical expressions, it does not protect every communication addressing those topics).
103. See Aguilar v. Avis Rent-a-Car Sys., Inc., 980 P.2d 846, 854 (Cal. 1999)
(defending restrictions on speech since the statute did not target protected expression).
104. See Welch v. Brown, 907 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1112 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (concluding
that some forms of SOCE that are carried out by speech and communication occurring
during psychoanalysis are entitled to First Amendment protection).
105. Cf. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (treating as conduct those
words that have the power to present the danger the government seeks to prevent).
106. See Hightower v. City & Cnty. of S.F., No. C-12-5841 EMC, 2013 WL
361115, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2013) (explaining that even if a person intends to
convey a message by walking down the street naked, the general public is unlikely to
understand the particular message and, therefore, the conduct is not protected as
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sexual orientation of those with same-sex attractions, then it follows that
the therapists’ viewpoint is that something is inherently wrong with samesex attractions and that the patient needs therapy to get rid of the
undesirable attractions.107 Yet, according to plaintiffs, they have no
particular viewpoint on homosexuality and encourage their patients’ right
to self-determination.108
Alternatively, the therapists’ viewpoint may express nothing more than
the belief that sexual orientation can be changed.109 Even if this is the
therapists’ position, SOCE does not clearly convey a specific viewpoint,
despite the therapists’ intention to do so.110 If the test for determining
whether conduct falls within the protection afforded by the First
Amendment is whether that conduct is “so imbued with elements of
speech” that it clearly conveys a particular viewpoint and that viewpoint is
readily apparent to an observer, then SOCE necessarily fails that test
because it conveys a number of viewpoints.111
2. Senate Bill 1172 Is a Regulation on Medical Treatments and Survives
Rational Basis Review.
Senate Bill 1172 is nothing more than the state’s permissible exercise of
its power to regulate professional standards of behavior and competence.112
The courts presume that laws that do not infringe on any constitutional
rights pass scrutiny provided that they address a legitimate state interest
and bear a reasonable relation to achieving that end.113 The state has an
speech).
107. See, e.g., Memorandum in Support of Preliminary Injunction at 11:4-7, Pickup
v. Brown, No. 2:12-CV-02497-KJM-EFB, 2012 WL 6021465 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2012)
(rejecting the mainstream understanding that same-sex attraction is a variant of
sexuality and claiming homosexuality is the result of child molestation).
108. See id. at 15:9-13 (declaring that the therapist must respect client goals and
treatment choices and may not impose the therapist’s own preferences on the client).
109. See id. at 12:17-20 (indicating that Dr. Nicolosi believes that individuals are
capable of reducing their same-sex attractions).
110. See Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2010)
(distinguishing between purely expressive activity and conduct that could express an
idea but does not).
111. Compare Welch v. Brown, 907 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1116 (E.D. Cal. 2012)
(noting that plaintiffs practice SOCE because homosexuality is a sin), with Pickup v.
Brown, No. 2:12-CV-02497-KJM-EFB, 2012 WL 6021465, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 4,
2012) (indicating that the therapists’ motivation is supporting patients’ right to selfdetermination).
112. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996) (acknowledging
that the state’s power to regulate health matters out of a duty to protect the lives and
health of all its residents).
113. See Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of
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interest in the protection of minors.114 Because SB 1172 prohibits a form
of therapy whose efficacy or safety is not established, and because the
evidence shows that the therapy may in fact be harmful, the state’s ban on
the therapy rationally relates to its stated end.115 Although the veracity of
the reports that the legislature relied on to determine that conversion
therapies are harmful has not been established, the court presumes that
statutes that do not infringe on constitutional rights are valid.116 The
plaintiffs challenging SB 1172 bear the burden of showing that the
legislature could not reasonably have conceived the reports to be true, and,
unable to meet that burden, the plaintiffs’ challenge fails and SB 1172 must
stand.117
B. Even if the Court Had Found Senate Bill 1172 Regulates Expressive
Conduct, the Regulation Meets the Requirements of the Four-Pronged Test
Set Forth in O’Brien and Survives Intermediate Scrutiny.
As is often the case when courts are faced with challenged regulations,
the Ninth Circuit could have simply assumed, without actually reaching the
issue, that SB 1172 regulates expressive conduct and therefore must
survive heightened scrutiny.118 Even if the Court assumed SB 1172
implicates free speech rights, the law would still pass the heightened
scrutiny test set forth in O’Brien.119
SB 1172 easily satisfies the first prong of the O’Brien test, as the states

Psychology, 228 F.3d 1043, 1050 (9th Cir. 2000) (determining that rational basis was
the correct standard of review for a licensing scheme that did not implicate
fundamental rights).
114. See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk Cnty., 457 U.S.
596, 607-08 (1982) (finding a compelling interest in protecting minors from the trauma
of testifying in furtherance of the duty to protect the minors’ psychological well-being).
115. Cf. California v. Privitera, 591 P.2d 919, 923 (Cal. 1979) (upholding the state’s
prohibition on the administration of any drug for treating cancer that had not yet been
approved).
116. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961) (confirming
that legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power if any
facts reasonably may be conceived to justify their actions).
117. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis, 228 F.3d at 1050
(noting that a law withstands rational basis review if the state could have had a
legitimate reason for its action).
118. See, e.g., Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)
(assuming for the purposes of upholding a regulation that sleeping is expressive
conduct, but not deciding the issue).
119. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (specifying that a law
must be within the constitutional power of the state, further an important governmental
interest unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and be narrowly tailored).
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retain any powers that the United States Constitution does not specifically
enumerate as belonging to the federal government.120 As noted earlier, the
ban furthers the state’s interest in protecting the psychological well-being
of minors, thus satisfying the second prong of the test.121 It also satisfies
the third prong of the O’Brien test because the legislature narrowly tailored
SB 1172 by applying it only to minors and not all potential SOCE patients,
and by regulating only practices that have unproven efficacy and safety.122
SB 1172 satisfies the final prong of the O’Brien test because the California
legislature did not enact SB 1172 with the intention of suppressing
speech.123 Rather, based on the concern that SOCE causes psychological
harm, the legislature passed SB 1172 to prohibit therapy practices that
often result in vulnerable minors experiencing increased incidents of
depression, anxiety, and suicide.124 Any incidental infringement of free
speech is a byproduct, and not an intended outcome, of the regulation,
which is aimed at mitigating those harmful results.125 Because the
treatments result in psychological harm, it is only the techniques
themselves that the state wishes to regulate.126 Just as the state may
regulate abortion procedures in the face of medical uncertainty, the state
may also regulate those therapy procedures that it deems potentially
harmful.127
Although the O’Brien test does not specifically address whether a
regulation is content-based or content-neutral, courts only apply the

120. See Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173, 176 (1910) (stating that the state
police power includes regulating the medical profession).
121. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 230 (1972) (limiting parental
rights where harm to the physical or mental health of children may be inferred).
122. See Dream Palace v. Cnty. of Maricopa, 384 F.3d 990, 1016 (9th Cir. 2004)
(noting that the “narrowly tailored” requirement is fulfilled so long as the government’s
interest would be less effectively achieved in the absence of the regulation).
123. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 865 (West 2013) (declaring that the purpose of
the law is to protect vulnerable youth from harmful therapy practices predicated on
outdated medical theories).
124. See Pickup v. Brown, No. 2:12-CV-02497-KJM-EFB, 2012 WL 6021465, at
*5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2012) (noting that the legislature relied on the APA’s findings
that SOCE causes harm).
125. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968) (applying intermediate
scrutiny because the statute targeted only the non-communicative element of the
plaintiff’s behavior).
126. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150 (1973) (recognizing a state interest in
maximizing the safety of medical procedures).
127. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 128-29 (2007) (upholding the Partial
Birth Abortion Ban Act because the government found the procedure inhumane and not
medically necessary).
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O’Brien test to those laws that are content-neutral.128 While SB 1172 may
look like a content-based regulation at first glance because the law
distinguishes between different types of therapies, under a secondary
interpretation of content-neutral regulations, the law is content-neutral
because the predominant intent of the regulation is aimed at protecting
minors and not at chilling a specific type of therapy.129
C. Senate Bill 1172 Is Unlikely to Survive Strict Scrutiny Because the
Regulation Does Not Address an Actual Harm, and the Regulation Is Not
the Least Restrictive Means of Addressing the State’s Asserted Compelling
Interest.
Because the Ninth Circuit determined that SB 1172 is conduct, not
speech, the Court never reached the issue of whether SB 1172 is contentbased or viewpoint-based discrimination. Were the Court to determine on
rehearing that SB 1172 is a regulation on speech, the Court is likely to rely
on the traditional understanding of content-based regulations, rather than
looking to the legislative intent to determine that the law is contentneutral.130 The Court will likely find that the law is a content-based
regulation because SB 1172 is a prohibition on a specific type of therapy,
and because determining whether one is engaged in the prohibited therapy
requires looking at the content of the therapy session.131
Content-based regulations are presumptively invalid, and therefore, the
burden falls on the state to prove that the regulation is not
unconstitutional.132 With such a high burden, California will likely be
unable to show that SB 1172 serves a compelling interest, is narrowly
tailored, and is the least restrictive means of achieving its end.133 While
128. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659 (2011) (applying strict
scrutiny to content-based regulations on commercial speech).
129. Cf. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986)
(examining the main impetus for a regulation banning adult theaters in certain
neighborhoods, and finding that because the regulation was aimed at the secondary
effects of the theaters, and not speech, the regulation was content neutral).
130. See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010) (defining
content-based regulations as restrictions based on the subject matter, such as media
depicting animal cruelty).
131. See, e.g., Berger v. City of Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029, 1051 (9th Cir. 2009)
(concluding that a regulation allowing street performers to passively solicit donations
was a content-based regulation, singling out certain forms of content for differential
treatment).
132. See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2739 (2011)
(finding that the state failed to meet its burden of showing an actual psychological harm
from violent video games, as opposed to just potential harm).
133. See Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 962 (9th
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protecting the safety and health of a minor is a recognized compelling
interest, the state must be able to show that its regulation protects against
an actual harm, not just a potential or speculative harm.134 When exploring
the need for SB 1172, the California Legislature relied on the findings of
the APA Task Force, which indicated that the potential harms from
conversion therapies are great.135 But potential harms are not enough to
justify a content-based regulation of free speech.136 Further, the state
would be unable to show that SOCE is the cause of these harms, rather than
other life activities beyond the control of the state.137 As such, SB 1172
would not survive strict scrutiny if the legislature asserted the protection of
minors as its compelling interest.138
Moreover, the government likely could not show that regulating mental
health providers who provide SOCE to minors is the least restrictive means
of achieving its end.139 Even if the state could show that the regulation
addressed an actual harm, many other less restrictive regulations could
sufficiently protect the health and safety of California minors.140 Possible
less restrictive regulations include requiring informed consent rather than
imposing an outright ban, or prohibiting only those treatments that do not
implicate speech at all and are questionable even by the standards of the
mental health providers who do provide conversion therapy.141 Not even
Cir. 2009) (noting that a compelling interest may be hard to show because no field is so
well understood that no new discoveries are possible).
134. See Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2739 (striking down a statute as not
satisfying strict scrutiny since the state did not show video games caused minors to act
aggressively).
135. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 865 (West 2013) (identifying the potential
harms of SOCE as, inter alia, depression, substance abuse, self-hatred, hostility, and
problems with intimacy).
136. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 819-20
(2000) (emphasizing that anecdotal evidence and supposition are insufficient to prove
actual harm).
137. See Welch v. Brown, 907 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1120 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (citing
plaintiffs’ declarations indicating that the cause of the harms are unsupportive parents,
stigma, bullying, and other factors, rather than SOCE).
138. See Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2738-39 (noting that ambiguous proof
is not sufficient for showing an actual harm).
139. See Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 964-65
(9th Cir. 2009) (indicating that the burden rests on the state to show that less restrictive
means are not available, even if less effective).
140. See Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 948 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding
that, despite a compelling interest to protect minors, requiring a juvenile curfew
without exceptions for legitimate night-time activity was not narrowly tailored).
141. Cf. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2013) (requiring informed consent, including
disclosure of foreseeable risks and discomforts and alternative treatments, from any
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the therapists who provide conversion therapy could characterize as speech
the treatments that Sam Brinton endured.142
D. Even Though Senate Bill 1172 Is Unlikely to Withstand Strict Scrutiny,
the Regulation Is Still Constitutional Because It Falls Under Two
Exceptions to the Strict Scrutiny Standard.
1. Even if Senate Bill 1172 Infringes on Constitutional Rights, Regulations
that Safeguard the Health and Safety of the Public Are Reviewed Under the
Rational Basis Test.
The rational basis test is appropriate not only for regulations that do not
infringe upon constitutional rights, but also when danger to health is
present, regardless of whether those regulations implicate fundamental
rights.143 California has a legitimate interest in safeguarding the health of
its citizens and may infringe on fundamental rights to further this goal.144
Although the courts have historically only applied this exception to the
right to privacy in the context of abortion regulations, nothing suggests that
this exception could not apply to fundamental rights in other areas of
medicine.145 The likelihood that the state would apply this exception is
especially high in situations in which minors are involved, particularly
those minors the state finds vulnerable, as California courts have previously
allowed regulations for minors that it would not allow for adults.146 Thus,
although California’s regulatory power to prohibit patients from seeking
conversion therapy may not extend to adults, it undoubtedly does extend to
minors, as evidenced by the state’s willingness to mandate regulations for

research subject).
142. Cf. Pitcherskaia v. INS, 118 F.3d 641, 648 (9th Cir. 1997) (equating
Pitcherskaia’s conversion therapy, involving electroshock, with torture and
persecution).
143. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (indicating that the state may
infringe on a woman’s privacy right when the danger to her health outweighs the safety
of the procedure).
144. See Wilson v. Cal. Health Facilities Comm’n, 167 Cal. Rptr. 801, 804 (Ct.
App. 1980) (acknowledging that the state may regulate procedures that infringe upon
fundamental rights when there is a legitimate interest in safeguarding the health of its
citizens).
145. Cf. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (indicating that the right to
privacy can outweigh the right to free speech, such as when the listener is a captive
audience).
146. See, e.g., Meyers v. Arcata Union High Sch. Dist., 75 Cal. Rptr. 68, 73 (Ct.
App. 1969) (recognizing that schools may impose stricter regulations on student
constitutional rights than would be permissible to impose on adults).
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youths but not adults.147 Even if the Court vacates its decision and finds
that SB 1172 implicates free speech rights, it should still only apply
rational basis review because SOCE poses a danger to health.148
2. Even if Senate Bill 1172 Is a Content-Based Regulation, Sexual
Orientation Change Efforts Are Best Characterized as Fraud, Which the
First Amendment Does Not Protect.
Even if the Ninth Circuit were to determine that SB 1172 regulates
speech, and rejected the danger-to-health exception discussed above, the
Court is still unlikely to review SB 1172 under strict scrutiny because SB
1172 protects against fraud.149 There is little, if any, question that the
therapists’ statements result in a legal harm—a required element to prove
fraud—because, at the very least, the claims that the therapists can diminish
or eliminate same-sex attractions through SOCE result in a pecuniary loss
by the patients paying for useless services, and the therapists’ intent in
making these statements is for the purpose of eliciting compensation.150
The patients satisfy the second element of fraud—showing justifiable
reliance on the therapists’ misrepresentations—because the patients, often
desperate for a “cure” for homosexuality, have no reason to believe that
licensed professionals are touting anything more than snake oil.151
The difficult element in characterizing SOCE as fraud is showing that
the therapists knew their statements were false; however, there are several
indications that the therapists know or should know that promoting SOCE
as an effective treatment is a misrepresentation.152 First, in Welch v.

147. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895 (1992)
(invalidating the spousal notice provision of the Abortion Control Act, but upholding
the parental notification requirement).
148. Cf. California v. Privitera, 591 P.2d 919, 922 (Cal. 1979) (noting that the right
to choose an abortion does not include the right to choose the type of procedure, and
that the regulations need only pass rational basis review).
149. See, e.g., Engalla v. Permanente Med. Grp., Inc., 938 P.2d 903, 917 (Cal.
1997) (requiring that a claim of fraud show that the speaker made a knowingly false
representation with the intent to deceive the listener, that the listener justifiably relied
on the misrepresentation, and that the listener suffered actual harm).
150. See Pohl v. Mills, 24 P.2d 476, 480 (Cal. 1933) (recognizing that paying for a
copyrighted structure without receiving a copyrighted structure constitutes a pecuniary
loss and meets the damages element for alleging a fraudulent action).
151. See Dyke v. Zaiser, 182 P.2d 344, 351 (Cal. Ct. App. 1947) (asserting that a
person with inferior knowledge may justifiably rely on the assertions of a speaker when
the speaker knows he or she is the more knowledgeable party).
152. See Harper v. Silver, 19 Cal. Rptr. 78, 80-81 (Ct. App. 1962) (indicating that a
speaker knowingly makes a false statement when available information indicates the
statement is false).
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Brown, plaintiff Anthony Duk admits that he has never had any success
with any of his patients;153 thus, even if he professes to believe that SOCE
works, his statements claiming that SOCE is an effective treatment indicate
a reckless disregard for the truth.154 Second, every major medical
organization has rejected SOCE, and former conversion therapy advocates
have rescinded their studies supporting SOCE.155 A reasonable person,
aware of every major medical organization’s rejection of SOCE and who
follows medical organizations’ ethical codes, would know or have reason
to believe that SOCE is not an effective treatment.156
Generally, the belief that a person can change her sexual orientation is a
social or religious belief instead of a fact, and is not sufficient to bring
SOCE under the umbrella of fraud.157 However, because the plaintiffs in
both Welch v. Brown and Pickup v. Brown characterized this belief as a fact
and, as professionals, held their beliefs out as fact to their patients, the
court will treat their opinions as material representations of fact.158
E. Senate Bill 1172 Does Not Substantially Infringe Upon Religious Rights
Because the Law Does Not Force the Patients to Choose Between
Following Their Religion and Complying with the Law.
Though the Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiffs waived the argument
that Senate Bill 1172 violates their religious rights, and therefore did not
address the issue on appeal, SB 1172 does not substantially infringe upon
the plaintiffs’ religious beliefs because it fails the test that was set forth in
Thomas.159 The plaintiffs alleging the violations of the free exercise of

153. Welch v. Brown, 907 F.2d 1102, 1106 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2012).
154. See Yellow Creek Logging Corp. v. Dare, 30 Cal. Rptr. 629, 632-33 (Ct. App.

1963) (noting that a reckless disregard for truth is a statement made with no basis for
its truth).
155. Cf. In re Am. Coll. for Advancement in Med., No. 962 3147, 1998 WL
847999, at *2 (F.T.C. Dec. 1998) (prohibiting the American College for Advancement
in Medicine from claiming that chelation therapy is an effective treatment when no
reliable scientific evidence supports the claim).
156. See, e.g., Kockelman v. Segal, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 552, 558 (Ct. App. 1998)
(recognizing that a psychiatrist must treat his patients in accordance with the standards
of the profession).
157. See Chavez v. Citizens for a Fair Farm Labor Law, 148 Cal. Rptr. 278, 280
(Ct. App. 1978) (explaining that fraud requires a false representation of fact because
there is no such thing as a false idea under the First Amendment).
158. See, e.g., Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 768 (Cal. 1992) (finding
that an opinion is a positive assertion of fact when the opinion is “not a casual
expression of belief but a deliberate affirmation of the matters stated”).
159. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717-18
(1981) (finding that a religious burden exists where a person must choose between
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religion are minors, and SB 1172 does nothing to regulate the behavior of
the minors.160 The minors may seek SOCE from any religious counselors
who perform conversion therapy.161 Because the minors are not forced to
choose between following the law and following the religious beliefs that
compel them to seek therapy, SB 1172 has no coercive effect on the
plaintiffs and does not substantially burden the free exercise of their
religion.162
F. Senate Bill 1172 Does Not Infringe on Religious Rights Because It Is a
Neutral Law of General Applicability.
Freedom of religious belief is absolute; yet, the state may regulate the
actions stemming from those beliefs if the laws are generally applicable,
neutral, and can withstand the corresponding scrutiny.163 In the context of
SB 1172, the religious belief is the idea that homosexuality is a sin or that it
is not a natural way of life; the conduct is the therapists’ or the patients’
efforts to change the orientation to align with those religious beliefs.164
SB 1172 is facially neutral, as it does not single out any particular
religion and applies to even those therapists who engage in SOCE with no
underlying religious motivations.165 Nor does SB 1172 covertly suppress
religious beliefs, which would also destroy its neutrality.166 If the
California legislature was primarily motivated by the religious undertone of
SOCE, the legislature would have prohibited all SOCE, not just those

following the law or following his religion).
160. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 865.1 (West 2013) (regulating the professional
conduct of mental health providers).
161. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 865.2 (West 2013) (censuring only mental
health providers who engage in SOCE with minors because the law is a regulation on
professional conduct).
162. Cf. O’Brien v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Serv., 894 F. Supp. 2d 1149,
1159 (E.D. Mo. 2012) (finding no free exercise violation where an employer must
provide contraceptives through its health plan because the regulation does not require
the employer to use the contraceptives).
163. See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 894
(1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (confirming the Court’s long established
differentiation between the religious belief and engaging in conduct associated with
that belief).
164. Cf. id. at 874-75 (implying a difference between believing peyote serves a
religious purpose and ingesting it).
165. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
533 (1993) (explaining that if the purpose of the law infringes on religion, then the law
is not facially neutral).
166. See id. (extending freedom of religion not only to laws that facially burden
religion but also to laws covertly suppressing religious beliefs or expression).
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forms of SOCE that are performed on minors by licensed health
providers.167 Rather, the California Legislature relied on the professional
expertise of the APA and other reputable organizations to find that SOCE
reflects an outdated medical position and that the therapies often lead to
heightened anxiety, confusion, and suicide, among other ills.168 While the
legislative history indicates that the legislators were aware that those
individuals who seek SOCE are generally deeply religious, the legislative
history does not indicate any intention of impeding the religious beliefs of
those individuals or their therapists through the Bill.169
Not only is SB 1172 neutral, but it is also generally applicable because
the law infringes equally on religious and non-religious professional
conduct that is thought to bring about harm to minors.170 SB 1172 applies
to any mental health provider who performs SOCE on a minor.171 SB 1172
prohibits minors from seeking SOCE from licensed healthcare providers,
but it does nothing to interfere with the minors’ ability to seek treatment
from non-licensed providers, such as religious counselors.172 Likewise,
mental health providers may still engage in conversion therapy with
adults.173 Assume, for example, that half of the therapists engaging in
SOCE are religiously motivated and half of the therapists engaging in
SOCE have no religious convictions about homosexuality.174 Assume also
that half of the individuals seeking conversion therapy are religiously
motivated and half of the individuals seeking conversion therapy do so for
167. Cf. id. (emphasizing that Florida banned animal sacrifice because it involved
the Santerian practice of animal sacrifice).
168. Cf. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 163 (2007) (asserting that state and
federal legislatures have broad discretion with regards to regulations in the face of
medical uncertainty).
169. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 865 (West 2013) (noting that the impetus
behind SB 1172 is the protection of LGBTQ minors from a psychologically damaging
“therapy”).
170. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 533 (explaining that a law
is not generally applicable if it burdens religious conduct but does not apply to conduct
that similarly undermines the law and yet is not religiously motivated).
171. See BUS. & PROF. § 865 (censuring all mental health providers engaging in
SOCE with minors without regard to the providers’ motivations).
172. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 865.1 (West 2013) (prohibiting mental health
providers from engaging in SOCE with patients under eighteen years of age, but
imposing no other restrictions).
173. Cf. In re R.V., 89 Cal. Rptr. 3d 702, 708 (Ct. App. 2009) (allowing a probation
term for a minor that would be unconstitutional for an adult because minors require
protection).
174. Cf. Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U.S. 299, 304 (1896) (stating that a regulation
prohibiting trains from running on Sundays is no less a regulation just because some
religions reserve Sunday as a day of rest).
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other reasons.175 SB 1172 does not substantially regulate only the
religiously motivated conduct while leaving whole non-religiously
motivated conduct. Rather minors—both those religiously motivated to
seek SOCE and those who do so for other reasons—are still free to access
services from religious counselors.176 Adults—regardless of motivation—
are still free to access the services; therapists—both those with religious
convictions on homosexuality and those without—are free to provide
SOCE to adults.177
Although SB 1172 is a neutral and generally applicable law, the standard
of scrutiny that the Court would have applied when reviewing the law is
unclear.178 If the Court applied the rational basis test, then SB 1172 would
stand.179 California has a legitimate interest in protecting the health and
welfare of its minors, and banning SOCE rationally relates to that end.180
Alternatively, the ban would not withstand strict scrutiny because the
asserted compelling interest does not address an actual harm.181
Ultimately, because the Ninth Circuit decided that SB 1172 regulated
conduct and not speech, the Court likely would have applied rational basis
review instead of strict scrutiny.182 Ninth Circuit precedent indicates the

175. Cf. Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1129 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining
that laws of general applicability—those not targeting religious conduct—need only
pass rational basis review).
176. Cf. Islamic Ctr. of Miss., Inc. v. City of Starkville, 840 F.2d 293, 299 (5th Cir.
1988) (noting that the First Amendment does not prohibit the government from
enacting neutral regulations that make the free exercise of religion more difficult).
177. Cf. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) (finding that denying federal
funding for abortions does not force physicians to give up abortion-related speech, as it
only denies use of funds).
178. See Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court of Sacramento
Cnty., 85 P.3d 67, 91 (Cal. 2004) (declining to identify the review level as the law
passed strict scrutiny).
179. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 629 n.27 (2008) (noting
that most laws pass rational basis review).
180. Cf. California v. Privitera, 591 P.2d 919, 922 (Cal. 1979) (drawing on Roe v.
Wade to find a law requiring a drug be certified effective before use is reasonable to
protect health).
181. See Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 962 (9th
Cir. 2009) (finding that the potential for psychological harm from video games is
insufficient to justify a ban).
182. See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82
(1990) (distinguishing prior cases reviewed under strict scrutiny because those cases
involved multiple constitutional challenges). But see Church of the Lukumi Babalu
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 567 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring)
(recognizing the illogicalness of the “hybrid rule” because it either would be so broad
as to cover most constitutional claims or would be redundant if a law violated another
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Court would embrace strict scrutiny only for those challenges that involve
more than one constitutional challenge.183
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATION
First Amendment challenges are nothing new in the medical field and
have resulted in both gains and losses for moving forward science and
individual rights.184 While the courts theoretically must decide cases based
on an objective interpretation of the law, political bias often plays a role in
how an issue is decided.185 Were the Ninth Circuit to rehear Pickup v.
Brown, the liberal social leanings of the Ninth Circuit could conceivably
influence the Court to reverse its decision if the Court were to consider the
significant effects of its decision with regards to other areas of the law.186
Were the Court to strike down SB 1172 on free speech grounds, it would
likely do so based on the integrity of the physician-patient relationship and
the need to protect resulting communications.187 If the Court were to
protect treatment effectuated through speech, then clearly the Court must
find that the First Amendment also protects the communications in which
the physicians engage with patients as part of treatment.188 Striking down
SB 1172 would have significant negative repercussions for at-risk LGBTQ
youth, but, ironically, it could result in significant positive effects for the
constitutional right).
183. See, e.g., Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 165 F.3d 692, 705 (9th
Cir. 1999) (applying the hybrid exception and requiring a plaintiff to show that the law
violates a companion right).
184. See, e.g., N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Grp., Inc. v. San Diego Cnty. Superior
Court, 189 P.3d 959, 967 (Cal. 2008) (preventing a doctor from denying care to
lesbians despite a religious objection).
185. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550-51 (1896) (upholding
segregation because it was based on the established custom and traditions of the state),
overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
186. See Maura Dolan, California Ban on Gay Therapy Put on Hold, L.A. TIMES
(Dec. 22, 2012, 8:14 AM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2012/12/gay-therapyban-placed-on-hold-in-california.html (noting that President Obama appointed the
judge who found SB 1172 to be constitutional while President Bush appointed the
judge who granted the injunction).
187. See Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 637 (9th Cir. 2002) (recognizing the
importance of affording constitutional protection to speech between physicians and
their patients); see also Pickup v. Brown, 728 F.3d 1042, 1053 (9th Cir. 2013) (stating
that doctor-patient communications about medical treatments are entitled to substantial
First Amendment protection and communication that occurs during therapy is entitled
to some First Amendment protection).
188. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 75040 (2009) (requiring primary care clinics to
provide pre-abortion and post-abortion counseling, including an explanation of
alternatives and possible risks).
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pro-choice movement.189
The pro-choice community has long struggled with state regulations on
abortion practices, including compelled speech and religious-based opt-out
clauses for physicians and medical staff who do not want to participate in
the provision of abortions.190 Particularly egregious are laws that require
physicians to tell patients seeking abortions that there are correlations
between abortion and breast cancer, that the fetus may feel pain, and that
the fetus is a living being, despite the lack of reputable medical or scientific
support for these statements and the fact that the physicians do not
necessarily believe the information that they are compelled to provide.191
Striking down SB 1172 on free speech grounds could provide support for
pro-choice advocates to renew constitutional challenges to abortion
regulations.192 If a physician performing SOCE is allowed to choose, free
from state regulation, what he can and cannot say, then logically, a
physician providing abortions should be afforded those same constitutional
protections.193 Most notably, striking down SB 1172 would run afoul of
Justice Stevens’ opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, which dismissed the asserted free speech rights of
the physicians performing abortions to not engage in compelled speech.194
While one might try to distinguish Casey from the SB 1172 challenges
because Casey turned on the undue burden test, that test only implicates the
privacy right associated with obtaining an abortion, and not the correlating
free speech issues.195
189. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992)
(dismissing the physicians’ free speech claims because the speech is only in the context
of medical practice).
190. See
State
Policies
in
Brief,
GUTTMACHER
INST.,
https://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_MWPA.pdf (last visited on Sept.
15, 2013) (noting that thirty-five states require counseling before abortion, five states
require physicians to make inaccurate correlations between cancer and abortion, and
twenty-five states require physicians to provide patients with written materials).
191. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, 906
(8th Cir. 2012) (finding no free speech violation when the state requires physicians to
disclose a correlation between suicide and abortions).
192. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Ind. v. Comm’r of Ind. Dep’t of Health, 794
F. Supp. 2d 892, 916 (S.D. Ind. 2011) (upholding a law that doctors must tell abortion
patients that life begins at conception).
193. Cf. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D., 686 F.3d at 905-06 (explaining that
a state may use its authority to require a physician provide truthful, non-misleading
information relevant to a patient’s decision, even in the absence of scientific support).
194. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) (finding
that the licensing and regulation power of the state encompasses physician speech in
medical treatment).
195. Cf. Stuart v. Huff, 834 F. Supp. 2d 424, 430 (M.D.N.C 2011) (rejecting the
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Assume that SB 1172 is struck down on freedom of religion grounds,
allowing mental healthcare providers to impose psychological harm on
their patients because of their religious beliefs. Currently, physicians who
do not support abortions may opt out of providing them on religious
grounds.196 This same exception—opting in because of religious beliefs—
does not exist for those physicians who hold deep-seated beliefs on the
provision of abortion.197 Yet, some physicians do feel this way.198 Because
the courts play a very limited role in determining whether a religious belief
is a religious belief—looking only to whether the belief is a sincerely held
religious belief—the state must permit physicians who provide abortions
based on their sincerely-held religious beliefs to do so, even when
practicing at a hospital or facility that denies abortions based on its own
religious beliefs.199 To allow mental healthcare providers whose religious
convictions compel them to opt out of laws prohibiting them from inflicting
psychological harm on their patients, but not to allow physicians whose
religious convictions compel them to provide abortions to avoid inflicting
emotional harm on their patients, would violate the First Amendment’s
protection of fundamental rights.200
Sacrificing the mental health of LGBTQ youth in favor of strengthening
challenges to abortion regulations, or vice versa, is not a suitable outcome.
Fortunately, there is a scenario in which the courts could uphold SB 1172,
and thus protect LGBTQ youth, while creating precedent that could benefit
the pro-choice movement. Upholding SB 1172 on the ground that SOCE is
fraud, and thus not subject to First Amendment protection, would bolster
city ordinances attempting to prevent crisis pregnancy centers (CPCs) from

undue burden test for laws requiring physicians to give patients a verbal description of
ultrasound images before abortions).
196. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123420(a) (West 2013) (prohibiting
discipline of employees who refused to provide abortions).
197. See, e.g., HEALTH & SAFETY § 123420(c) (specifying facilities that do not
provide abortions may not be compelled to do so).
198. See, e.g., Cassie Murdoch, Meet the Christian, Formerly Anti-Abortion Doctor
Who Now Performs Late-Term Abortions, JEZEBEL (May 29, 2012, 6:15 PM),
http://jezebel.com/5913841/meet-the-christian-formerly-anti+abortion-doctor-whonow-performs-late+term-abortions (noting that Dr. Parker’s religious commitment to
compassion compels him to provide abortions).
199. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184 (1965) (stating that a court’s
role is to objectively determine whether the claimed belief occupies the same place in
the life as a belief in God holds in the life of a person qualified for an exemption).
200. Cf. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 591 (1989) (explaining that
the First Amendment prohibits the expression of a preference for one religion over
another).
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falsely misleading women.201 Finding that the free speech and freedom of
religion clauses in the federal and California constitutions do not protect
false physician speech that results in harm, and also finding that the state
may permissibly regulate that speech, would allow the state to regulate the
false speech at CPCs that purport to offer reproductive health services, such
as abortion and the morning-after pill, but in reality do not provide those
services and delay patient access to such services in the hope that the
patient will be forced into unwanted motherhood.202 Upholding SB 1172
would provide a basis for regulating even those CPCs that provide only
counseling, and therefore do not employ a medical staff, on the premise
that statements based on junk science or suspect research give rise to
negligent misrepresentation, which is an actionable form of fraud.203
Should the Ninth Circuit en banc decide that SB 1172 does not withstand
review, the legislature need only modify the law for it to pass constitutional
scrutiny.204 At a minimum, the legislature should specifically target all of
the physical SOCE techniques, such as electroshock therapy, forcing
patients to strip down and cuddle with older male therapists, and having
patients beat effigies of their mothers. By only targeting the practices that
are obviously conduct, the legislature will forestall any further free speech
claims while eradicating some of the most offensive SOCE practices.205
Furthermore, the legislature should commission a reputable study on the
harmful effects of SOCE, particularly one that focuses on its effects on
minors.206 By showing that SOCE results in actual harm and that SB 1172
protects against that harm, the State will be better positioned to fend off
201. See, e.g., First Resort, Inc. v. Herrera, No. C 11-5534 SBA, 2012 WL
4497799, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2012) (dismissing all but the First Amendment
challenge to San Francisco’s ordinance prohibiting CPCs from making false or
misleading representations about their stance on abortion).
202. See Lewis v. Pearson Found., Inc., 908 F.2d 318, 319 (Mo. 1990) (detailing a
visit to a CPC where the center personnel claimed that they would help the patient
obtain an abortion but instead showed her graphic images and sent her to a hospital that
did not provide abortions).
203. Cf. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 768 (Cal. 1992) (noting that
misrepresentation includes statements the speaker believes to be true but for which the
speaker has no reasonable basis).
204. See Reporter’s Transcript of Proceedings at 9:20-22, Welch v. Brown, 907 F.
Supp. 2d 1102 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (conceding that many of the SOCE treatments are
indisputably conduct and subject to the state’s regulation).
205. Cf. Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 506, 519 (1983) (recognizing states’
broad discretion in regulating medical standards, provided they do not deviate from
accepted practices).
206. See APA TASK FORCE, supra note 4, at 3-4 (finding that SOCE studies are
inconclusive as to whether SOCE is harmful to minors because the methods utilized in
the studies were questionable and only involved adults).
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constitutional challenges to SB 1172.207
V. CONCLUSION
The rights guaranteed by the United States and California constitutions
are the bedrock of society, and only the most important governmental
interests can, and should, justify an intrusion upon those rights.208
However, those rights cannot be used as a sword to strike down any valid
regulation that one might find disagreeable.209
SB 1172 is merely one more permissible regulation in a series of
regulations in the medical field that safeguard citizens; it does not infringe
on any fundamental rights.210 To allow therapists to claim that the First
Amendment insulates words used during therapy sessions from regulation
would leave the entire mental health field unregulated and would protect
traditional physicians from liability resulting from misdiagnoses and
prescriptions for incorrect medications.211 For the medical profession to
remain effective and safe, the state must be allowed to regulate those
procedures that pose a threat to its citizens.212 Likewise, while the state
may not target those religious practices and beliefs that it finds offensive,
state and federal constitutions must allow the states to make laws that
promote the health and safety of its citizens without fear that any person
claiming the law conflicted with her religious belief would be able to
circumnavigate the law.213 For these reasons, the Ninth Circuit must affirm
207. Cf. Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 961-62
(9th Cir. 2009) (determining that while the state has a compelling interest in protecting
the psychological welfare of minors, there must be proof of actual harm).
208. See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis
of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 815 (2006) (reviewing
4,000 laws that infringed on speech and finding that only twenty-two percent survived
strict scrutiny).
209. Cf., e.g., McChesney v. Hogan, No. 9:08-CV-1186, 2012 WL 3686083, at *19
(N.D.N.Y. July 30, 2012) (rejecting the argument that mandated sexual offender
counseling infringes on the free exercise of religion even if the programs reference
religion).
210. Cf. United States v. Lane Labs-USA Inc., 427 F.3d 219, 222, 236 (3d Cir.
2005) (affirming an injunction against the distribution of drugs that the FDA had not
yet approved).
211. Cf. O’Brien v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Serv., 894 F. Supp. 2d 1149,
1152 (E.D. Mo. 2012) (finding that the First Amendment does not protect doctors when
prescribing drugs).
212. Cf. Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of
Psychology, 228 F.3d 1043, 1054 (9th Cir. 2000) (indicating that the state owes a duty
to its citizens to protect them from incompetent, irresponsible, or untrustworthy
professionals who seek to obtain money through provision of these services).
213. Cf. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) (explaining that the
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its original decision, should it grant the plaintiffs motion for rehearing. As
Justice Scalia noted, any other result would lead to anarchy.214

Free Exercise of Religion Clause embraces two distinct concepts: that the freedom to
believe is absolute and that the freedom to act on those beliefs is not).
214. See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879
(1990) (noting that to allow a person to ignore the law in favor of personal beliefs
would be equivalent to making religion superior to the law).
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